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We  investigate  the misallocation of credit  in  Japan associated with banks’ evergreening  loans, 































dramatically  changed  the  performance  of  the  Japanese  economy  and  the  functioning  of  its 
banking  system.  The  post‐bubble  period  has  been  characterized  as  a  prolonged  period  of 
economic malaise in Japan, commonly known as the “Lost Decade,” although it extended well 








bank  relationships,  government pressure  on  banks  to  help  avoid  firm  bankruptcies,  and  the 
perverse  incentives  faced by  troubled banks  to delay  their unhealthy borrowers’ bankruptcy, 




This study  takes a closer  look at  the evergreening behavior of  the Lost Decade. We make 
three  contributions. First, we distinguish between  the  financial health and  technical health of 
firms to better identify evergreening behavior toward nonviable firms. We use a direct measure 


















While  the existing  literature has,  for  the most part,  interpreted  the evidence as providing 




cases weak balance‐sheet and  income measures are associated with  increased  loan demand  to 



















alleviated by additional credit, some of which can be used  for such  things as restructuring  its 
operations  as  well  as  net  investment,  additional  loans  could  improve  subsequent  firm 
performance. Thus, bank  lending  to  financially distressed but economically viable  firms may 
have beneficial effects. On the other hand, additional loans to a firm that is not fundamentally 
sound could represent a misallocation of credit by allowing  the  firm  to merely cover ongoing 






be calculated at  the  individual‐firm  level. However, as Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap  (2008) 
note, manufacturing is the industry likely to be least affected by the presence of zombie firms, 
providing  a  high  hurdle  for  finding  evidence  of  evergreening  behavior  by  banks.  Still,  our 
comparisons across manufacturing  firms do  show  substantial variation  in both  technical and 
financial health. 
A number of possible explanations exist for the differential treatment of firms by  lenders. 
Thus,  distinguishing  among  bank  types  based  on  the  strength  of  their  incentives  to  lend  to 
nonviable  firms  can  provide  an  additional  path  for  isolating  evergreening  behavior.  While 
government pressure  likely provided a general  incentive for all banks  to evergreen  loans, one 
might  reasonably expect  the pressure  to have been greater on main banks  than on secondary 






regulatory  requirements. Thus,  secondary banks would have  the  least  incentive  to  evergreen 
loans,  basing  their  lending  behavior  primarily  on  the  expected  return:  a  business  decision. 
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likely to obtain  increased  loans the more financially distressed they were, not only  in the Lost 
Decade of the 1990s, but to a similar extent even during the boom period of the 1980s. This result 
suggests  that previous  findings of  increased bank  lending  to  firms  that were more  financially 
distressed may have been misinterpreted as evidence of widespread evergreening of loans when, 
in fact, such increased lending may have, in large part, reflected increased loan demand due to 
larger  cash‐flow  shortfalls by  firms as  they became more  financially distressed. Therefore,  to 
identify clearly the extent to which banks misallocated credit to nonviable firms, it is important 
to distinguish between  financial distress  and  technical distress. We  find  that  firms  that were 
operationally healthy were more likely to obtain increased loans, especially during the crisis years 
of the 1990s, when the underlying health of the firms became a more important determinant of 
bank  lending, perhaps because of the  increase  in firm bankruptcies (Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; 
Hamao, Mei, and Xu 2007). That is, during the boom period of the 1980s, banks may not have 








and  (2) zombie  firms, based on Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap  (2008). A  firm  is  identified as 
financially distressed if its operating income is less than its interest payments for two consecutive 











unhealthy  firms.  Whether  measuring  firm  financial  health  by  financial  distress  or  by 
“zombiness,” higher TFP  is associated with  increases  in both main‐bank and  secondary‐bank 
loans to financially healthy firms, but not to unhealthy firms, with an additional positive effect if 
the  firm’s main  bank  is  healthy, whether  or  not  the  recipient  firm  is  financially  healthy.  In 
addition, healthy main banks increase loans to financially healthy firms, while unhealthy main 
banks  increase  loans  to distressed and zombie  firms. Moreover, main banks  increase  loans  to 











technically  healthy  and  technically  unhealthy  firms,  and  between  financially  healthy  and 
financially unhealthy firms. We find that both technically healthy and financially healthy firms 
make much better use of increased credit than unhealthy firms do, and so do firms with healthy 
main  banks  relative  to  firms with unhealthy main  banks.  Strikingly,  increases  in  loans  from 
unhealthy main banks to unhealthy firms tend to decrease subsequent TFP, consistent with such 
loans being misallocated to firms that misuse the  increased credit to cover operating expenses 
rather  than  to  increase  net  investment  or  undertake  beneficial  restructuring  of  operations. 
Interestingly, while  the mechanism operates  through net  investment as one might expect,  for 
healthy firms increases in credit appear to operate through one or more additional channels even 
after controlling  for net  investment. Such evidence suggests  that  the misallocation of credit  in 
Japan during the 1990s may not have been as widespread as imagined, although it still points to 
substantial  evergreening  of  loans  by  unhealthy  banks  to  unhealthy  firms,  even  taking  into 
account the confounding of loan‐demand effects with loan‐supply effects in earlier studies.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  provides  some 
background for the relevant  issues addressed  in this study. Section III describes the data used 
and  the  method  for  calculating  total  factor  productivity.  Section  IV  provides  details  of  our 
empirical  specification  and  estimation  strategy.  Section V presents  the  empirical  results,  and 
Section VI concludes.  
II.   Background 
While most  firms  rely  on  credit  to  finance  their  operations,  this  credit may  be  obtained 














reducing  the  costs  of  financial  distress.  Their  measure  of  financial  distress  is  based  on  the 
coverage ratio, the ratio of operating income to interest payments. A firm is financially distressed 
if it has a coverage ratio greater than one, followed by two years with a coverage ratio less than 




One explanation  for  this  is  that such close  ties mitigate asymmetric  information problems, so 
lenders can identify which troubled firms remain viable and can renegotiate loans more easily. 





rather  than credit  risk analysis would have contributed  to  the misallocation of credit and  the 
evergreening of loans that many believe characterized Japanese bank behavior during the Lost 
Decade. 
Substantial  evidence  exists  that  Japanese  banks  continued  to  make  additional  loans  to 
severely distressed firms following the bursting of the stock market and real estate bubbles at the 
beginning of  the 1990s, even as both  the banking  sector and  the economy were  in  crisis. For 
example, Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003), Peek and Rosengren (2005), Ahearne and Shinada 





the  persistence  of  the  economic  malaise  experienced  by  the  Japanese  economy,  insofar  as 






banks  to  continue  allocating  credit  to  many  of  their  weakest  borrowers  in  order  to  avoid 
“mutually  assured  destruction.”  Because  the  reported  capital  ratios  of  troubled  banks  were 
already barely above  the  regulatory minimums,  the banks wanted  to avoid  reporting  further 
increases  in nonperforming  loans  that would have required  them  to write off, at  least  in part, 
existing loans and add to their loan loss reserves, actions that would have reduced their reported 
capital ratios. One mechanism  that would have enabled  troubled borrowers  to avoid, or  least 
delay, declaring bankruptcy and hence would have enabled the lending banks to avoid writing 
off the troubled loans is the evergreening of loans.  
Of  course,  evergreening  requires  bank  regulators  to  be  complicit  in  allowing  such  bank 
behavior, by permitting banks to overstate their capital and understate their problem loans, in 
part  to avoid  the high costs  that would be associated with widespread bank  failures and  the 
massive increase in unemployment that would ensue if many large firms fell into bankruptcy. In 















minimum value were more  likely to  increase  loans to their weakest borrowers. They also find 
that banks were more likely to increase loans to a weak firm if the bank was in the same keiretsu 
as  the  firm. Moreover,  focusing on  the debt‐to‐asset  ratio, another measure based on a  firm’s 
balance sheet, Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003) find similar evidence of forbearance lending to 
nonmanufacturing  firms, especially  in particularly  troubled  industries such as  real estate and 
construction, adversely impacting bank profitability. While the extensive misallocation of credit 




However,  a  problem  with  interpreting  results  that  indicate  increased  bank  lending  to 






extent that banks respond to this resulting  increase  in  loan demand by  increasing  loans to the 
firm,  we  would  observe  a  negative  correlation  between  increased  loans  to  the  firm  and  its 
working  capital  or ROA,  even  if  banks had not  shifted  their  credit‐supply  curve. Thus,  it  is 
important to control for a firm’s health with a measure that is not likely to also be driving the 
firm’s short‐term demand for credit.  
Caballero,  Hoshi,  and  Kashyap  (2008,  henceforth  CHK)  take  a  different  approach  for 





zombie  firms  as  those  firms  obtaining  loans  at  a  subsidized  interest  rate.  The  extent  of  the 
subsidization  is  based  on  the  difference  between  the  firm’s  actual  interest  payments  and  a 
hypothesized lower bound for interest payments based on the interest rate charged to the highest‐







dimensions,  including  distorting  competition,  deterring  entry  of  new  competitors,  and 












as  firm‐level  productivity.  It  is  entirely  plausible  that  some  firms  classified  as  financially 















bankruptcy,  conclusions  about  the  extent  to which  credit was misallocated  in  Japan  require 
distinguishing between financially distressed, but technically viable, firms and nonviable firms. 
Similarly,  loans  from  unhealthy  main  banks  are  much  more  likely  to  be  associated  with 
evergreening behavior, and thus less likely to be used to increase operational efficiency, while 
healthy  main  banks  have  less  incentive  to  make  such  loans,  although  they  may  still  make 
unproductive  loans based on historical bank‐firm relationships. On  the other hand, secondary 




















A  further  complication  is  that  fiscal  years  of  Japanese  firms  are  spread  throughout  the 
calendar year. While more than 90 percent of the firms in our sample have a March fiscal year‐















Because  credit availability may depend on bank health, we  control  for main‐bank health 
using  the  bank’s  market‐to‐book  ratio,  based  on  market  values  from  the  Nikkei  Financial 















for  the  same year. Outlier  observations  are  identified  in  this way  rather  than  for  the  overall 
sample  to  avoid  disproportionately  omitting  observations  in  specific  industries  that  tend  to 






Total factor productivity plays a key role  in our analysis. Therefore,  it  is  important to use 
state‐of‐the‐art techniques for computing firm‐level TFP. We assume that every industry operates 
according to a Cobb‐Douglas production function using capital, labor, and materials as its inputs. 
TFP  is  then measured  as  the  residual of output  adjusting  for  the  share of  capital,  labor,  and 
material inputs. 
The production function is of the standard form: 
௜ܻ,௝,௧ ൌ ܣ௜,௝,௧ ൬ܭ௜,௝,௧
ఉೕೖ ൰ ൬ܮ௜,௝,௧
ఉೕ೗ ൰ ൬ܯ௜,௝,௧
ఉೕ೘൰,              (1) 
where  ௜ܻ,௝,௧, representing the output of firm i belonging to industry j at time t, is a function of the 
firm’s capital stock, ܭ௜,௝,௧, labor, ܮ௜,௝,௧, and material inputs, ܯ௜,௝,௧. 	ߚ௝௞ , ߚ௝,௟ and ߚ௝௠	are the industry‐






industries.  The	ܣ௜,௝,௧  terms  measure  total  factor  productivity,  often  referred  to  as  the  Solow 
residual. 
Expressing equation (1) in logarithms yields a linear relationship between output and inputs: 




log	ሺܣ௜,௝,௧ሻ ൌ log	ሺ ௜ܻ,௝,௧ሻ െ ߚመ௝௞ log൫ܭ௜,௝,௧൯ െ ߚመ௝௟ log൫ܮ௜,௝,௧൯ െ ߚመ௝௠ log൫ܯ௜,௝,௧൯,    (3) 
where  ߚመ௝௞,  ߚመ௝௟,	and  ߚመ௝௠  are  estimated  using  regression  techniques.  The  measurement  of  the 









suggested  by  Wooldridge  (2009),  popularly  referred  to  as  the  Wooldridge‐Levinsohn‐Petrin 
method (WLP, see Petrin, White, and Reiter 2011), which allows for better measurement of TFP 
by further correcting the collinearity issues of the LP method.  
Because  the calculation of  firm‐level TFP  relies on estimating production  functions at  the 
industry level, we combine smaller industries with similar products and require that an industry 
have  at  least  10  firms on  average during our  sample period  to  ensure  that  there are  enough 








for  the cost of material  inputs and  then define TFP as  the residual share of value‐added after 
adjusting  for  the shares of capital and  labor. While both approaches have been applied  in  the 
literature  (for  example,  Javorcik  (2004)  and  Javorcik  and  Spatareanu  (2011)  use  the  output 
approach, and Petrin, White, and Rieter  (2011) use  the value‐added approach), we  follow  the 
suggestions of ACF (2006) and Petrin, White, and Reiter (2011), applying the WLP method to the 
27  industry‐specific, value‐added, production  functions, where equation  (2)  is modified  to  the 
value‐added (VA) form: 
log	ሺܸܣ௜,௝,௧ሻ ൌ log	ሺܣ௜,௝,௧ሻ ൅ ߚ௝௞ log൫ܭ௜,௝,௧൯ ൅ ߚ௝௟ log൫ܮ௜,௝,௧൯	,        (4) 
where value‐added is defined as output minus intermediate inputs, and output is measured as a 
firm’s gross sales adjusted  for  the change  in  finished goods, half‐finished goods, and work  in 





The remaining variable,  labor,  is measured as man‐hours  (employment multiplied by  the 
average number of hours worked per employee). We take the average of employment at the end 
of periods t and (t‐1) as the measure of a firm’s employees during period t. One drawback, not 

























Evergreening  refers  to  the  loan‐supply  behavior  of  banks  based  on  the  health  of  the 





for  the  general  macroeconomic  environment.  The  focus  is  on  the  distinction  between  firm 
financial health and firm technical health as factors determining the magnitude of any increase in 
loans  obtained  by  a  firm.  We  focus  on  a  firm’s  obtaining  an  increase  in  loans  outstanding 
compared with  the prior year because  to do  so  a  firm must  request  additional  loans  and be 
granted  additional  loans  by  its  potential  lender(s). On  the  other  hand,  ambiguity  surrounds 
situations when  loans  outstanding  to  a  firm  are unchanged  or decline  from  the prior  year’s 
amount. If loans are unchanged, it could be because the firm did not request additional loans or 
because,  even  though  the  firm  did  request  additional  loans,  potential  lenders  denied  the 










improve  their  TFP,  emphasizing  differences  in  firm  characteristics  and  the  source  of  the 
additional loans. This analysis can shed some light on the nature of any misallocation of credit 
during the 1990s. In particular, it may be that loans from unhealthy main banks may not increase 







஺௦௦௘௧೔,ೕ,೟షభ ൌ 	 ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵܨܫܴܯ௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾଶܤܣܰܭ௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾଷܣܨܨܫܮܫܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௝,௧ିଵ ൅
ܾସሺܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௝ܻ ∗ ܻܧܣܴ௧ሻ ൅ ܾହߜ௜ ൅ ݒ௜,௝,௧,		              (5) 
where		 ܮ݋ܽ݊௜,௝,௧ െ ܮ݋ܽ݊௜,௝,௧ିଵܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൌ 		
ܮ݋ܽ݊௜,௝,௧ െ ܮ݋ܽ݊௜,௝,௧ିଵ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜,௝,௧ିଵ 	݂݅	ܮ݋ܽ݊௜,௝,௧ െ ܮ݋ܽ݊௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൐ 0,		 
	and	zero	otherwise. 

















(t‐2) as a  control  for  the demand  for  credit, with a  low value  signaling a need  for additional 

































We also  include a  set of  (1,0) dummy variables  formed  from  the  interaction of  the  set of 
industry  dummy  variables with  the  set  of  year  dummy  variables,  INDUSTRY*YEAR.  These 





lending  behavior  of  the  main  banks  and  secondary  banks.  Standard  errors  for  the  Tobit 
specification  are  calculated  using  the  observed  information  matrix  based  on  asymptotic 
maximum likelihood theory. 
The  equation  specification  for  the  second  step  of  the  analysis  concerning  the  effect  of 
obtaining  additional  loans,  as  well  as  the  effect  of  other  firm  and  bank  characteristics,  on 
subsequent TFP is:  
ܶܨܲ	ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜,௝,௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܥܴܧܦܫ ௜ܶ,௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ܿଶܤܣܰܭ௜,௝,௧ିଵ 	൅ ܿଷܨܫܴܯ௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ܿସሺܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௝ܻ ∗
ܻܧܣܴ௧ሻ ൅	ܿହߜ௜ ൅ ݓ௜,௝,௧.                      (6) 
The dependent variable is measured as Log of TFP in period t minus Log of TFP in period (t‐
1). CREDIT includes Increase in Bonds/Assets, Increase in Main‐Bank Loans/Assets, and Increase 
in  Secondary‐Bank  Loans/Assets.  The  measure  of  bonds  outstanding  used  to  calculate  the 
increase in bonds includes commercial paper as well as straight bonds, convertible bonds, and 
bonds with attached warrants. The increase in bonds and the increase in loans are censored as 















which  in  turn contributes  to  improved TFP. We  thus estimate  regressions with  the  firm’s net 
investment, calculated as  the change  in net  fixed assets between periods  t and  (t‐1), scaled by 
lagged  (beginning‐of‐period) net  fixed  assets  as  the dependent variable,  and  the  increases  in 
bonds, main‐bank  loans, and  secondary‐bank  loans, as well as  the main‐bank‐health dummy 
variables  and  the  firm  characteristics  as  explanatory  variables. Here,  because  funding  of  the 
investment would occur in the same fiscal year as the investment itself, we use contemporaneous 














for  increases  in  secondary‐bank  loans. The panels contain  rows  for all  firms,  followed by  the 
results when the observations are disaggregated into cohorts of firms with healthy main banks, 
medium‐health  main  banks,  and  unhealthy  main  banks.  To  account  for  differences  across 
industries and across time, Average ROA and TFP are each measured relative to the median for 
the firm’s industry for each year. While firm‐health cohorts represent approximately one‐third of 
the  observations,  main‐bank‐health  cohort  observations  can  deviate  somewhat  from  thirds 
because of the unequal numbers of firms associated with individual main banks. 
The  top  part  of  Panel  A  indicates  that  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  firms  obtaining 
increased  total  loans were  in  the  low‐ROA  cohort,  consistent with  evergreening behavior by 
banks. Moreover, this pattern generally holds across the three cohorts based on the firms’ main‐
bank health,  in each  instance with  the shares rising as one moves across columns  from  left  to 
right. However, the panel provides no evidence that the least financially healthy firms (based on 
ROA) with unhealthy main banks were more  likely  to obtain  increased  loans  than were firms 
with  healthy main  banks. A  similar  pattern  occurs  in  the middle  part  of  Panel A  for  firms 



















disproportionately  represented  among  those  firms  obtaining  increased  total  loans  when  all 
observations are considered, in contrast to the pattern in Panel A. However, the next three rows 







However,  that pattern  is repeated only  for unhealthy main banks. Thus,  the patterns  for  firm 
health  based  on  technical  (TFP)  rather  than  financial  (ROA)  health  are  not  consistent  with 
evergreening behavior for firms with healthy or medium‐health main banks. In contrast, for firms 
with unhealthy main banks, whether we  focus on  technical or  financial  firm health, we see a 
similar  pattern  that  is  consistent with  evergreening  behavior:  the weaker  is  firm  health,  the 
greater the share of the firms receiving increased main‐bank loans.  
The bottom part of Panel B indicates that secondary banks show a consistent pattern of being 
less  likely  to  increase  loans  to a  firm  the weaker  is  the  firm’s  technical health. Moreover,  the 
pattern becomes more exaggerated the weaker is the firm’s main bank. Thus, the patterns are not 
consistent with secondary banks’ undertaking evergreening behavior; instead, secondary banks 
are  less  likely  to  increase  loans  the weaker  is  firm  technical health, and even  less willing  the 
weaker  is  the health of  the  firm’s main bank. Unlike unhealthy main banks, secondary banks 
appear to be more likely to make a business decision based on the likelihood of loan repayment 
rather  than  based  on  bank‐firm  relationships.  Thus,  the  patterns  of  bank  lending  appear  to 
suggest different stories about the extent to which evergreening occurred during Japan’s post‐






that  credit was being misallocated, Panel B  suggests  that  the problem  can be ascribed  to  the 






(1993  to  2000).  We  show  the  data  for  the  two  periods  separately  because  the  focus  of  our 
subsequent  analysis  is  on  the  post‐bubble  period,  when  banks  were  most  likely  to  be 
evergreening loans to their troubled borrowers.  
While  many  of  the  variables  have  similar  values  for  the  two  periods,  a  number  of  the 
variables  do  differ  notably,  as  might  be  expected  given  the  sharp  divergence  in  economic 
performance between  the  two subperiods. For example, TFP Growth, Net  Investment/Capital, 
Average ROA, Sales Growth, Change in ROA, and Change in Working Capital each deteriorate 












The benchmark  results are presented  in Table 3. The  first  two  columns  contain  the base 
specification that allows the boom (1984–1989) and post‐bubble (1993–2000) subsamples to have 
different estimated coefficients. As expected, firm technical health, as measured by Log of TFP, 







The  statistically  significant  negative  estimated  coefficients  on  Average  ROA,  a  primary 
measure of firm financial health in many previous studies, in both subperiods indicate that firms 
tend to receive a larger increase in loans, the lower is their ROA. The fact that the negative effect 





















(in absolute value)  in  the post‐bubble period  (when evergreening behavior  is  thought  to have 























loans with our measure of  the  increase  in main‐bank  loans, while Columns  7  and  8 use our 









by  the  fact  that  its  interaction with Average ROA now has  a  significant negative  coefficient, 
consistent with main‐bank evergreening behavior through providing larger loans to firms with 
weaker financial health.  
For  secondary‐bank  loans,  the  negative  Average  ROA  coefficients  are  not  significant, 
suggesting that secondary banks, unlike main banks, do not tend to provide larger increases in 
loans  to  firms  in poor  financial health.  In  addition,  the TFP*Healthy‐Main‐Bank  effect  is not 
significant, perhaps because the health of the firm’s main bank is less relevant for secondary‐bank 
lending  than  for main‐bank  lending. On  the other hand, secondary banks do  tend  to  increase 


























and 1994,  then declines sharply  in 1995, spikes again  in 1998, and  then drifts downward. The 
zombie classification produces shares ranging from about 7.5 percent to almost 17 percent of the 
firms during our sample period. The share increases through 1995, declines somewhat in 1996 
before  peaking  in  1997,  and  then  declines  steadily  for  the  rest  of  our  sample  period.  It  is 
worthwhile  to note here  that  in fiscal years 1997 (calendar year 1998) and 1998 (calendar year 
1999),  the  Japanese government made major capital  injections  into  the banking system  (Allen, 
Chakraborty,  Watanabe  (2011)).  The  patterns  exhibited  by  the  two  alternative  measures  of 




or secondary banks, although  the difference  relative  to non‐distressed or non‐zombie  firms  is 




are  arms‐length  sources  of  credit  that  are  based  on  a  firm’s  fundamentals  rather  than 
relationships, while secondary‐bank loans are much less tied to bank‐firm relationships than are 
main‐bank loans. However, the most striking difference among the correlations is the reversal in 







The next  two  tables  show  results  from  regressions  for  increases  in main‐bank  loans  and 
increases  in  secondary‐bank  loans  separately  for  subsets  of  firm  observations  based  on  the 










likely  to  increase  loans  to  technically  healthy  firms  and  are  less  likely  to  increase  loans  to 
technically unhealthy firms. While the estimated coefficients on Unhealthy Main Bank have the 
same sign, the coefficient for low‐TFP firms is twice as large and is significant. Thus, unhealthy 
main banks are more,  rather  than  less,  likely  to  increase  loans  to  technically unhealthy  firms. 
Similarly,  the  estimated  coefficients  on  Same  Keiretsu  are  opposite  in  sign,  with  only  the 
coefficient  for  technically unhealthy  firms being positive and significant. Thus,  it appears  that 
both keiretsu relationships and main‐bank relationships matter for unhealthy main banks when 


















for the unhealthy firms, suggesting that main banks are much more  likely to  increase  loans to 
unhealthy firms the lower is their ROA, consistent with evergreening behavior toward financially 








their  poor  health  and  have  difficulty  rolling  over  their maturing  bonds.  Loans/Assets  has  a 
significant  coefficient  only  for  distressed  and  zombie  firms,  consistent  with  main  banks’ 





















To  summarize,  main  banks  do  appear  to  distinguish  between  technically  healthy  and 
unhealthy firms generally, although they do not respond differently to the firms’ financial health 
based on their technical health category. Instead, the difference shows up only for the measures 
of  main‐bank  health  and  keiretsu  relationships,  and  those  differences  are  consistent  with 
unhealthy main banks’ undertaking evergreening behavior. However, when it comes to subsets 
of  firms  based  on  their  financial  distress  or  zombiness, main‐bank  behavior  consistent with 
evergreening behavior  toward  financially weaker  firms  is more prevalent, appearing across a 
wide  range  of  the  explanatory  variables.  Moreover,  such  behavior  is  relatively  stronger  for 
unhealthy main banks than for healthy main banks.  
Table 6, which repeats the Table 5 regressions but replaces the dependent variable with the 
increase  in  secondary‐bank  loans,  shows  that  evergreening‐type  behavior  is  not  nearly  as 
apparent for secondary banks, which is unsurprising, given that secondary banks do not have as 
strong  an  incentive  to  aid unhealthy  firms with which  they have  a weaker  relationship.  For 
distinctions based on technical health, shown in the first two columns, the point estimates of the 
two sets of coefficients are not generally similar, although they were generally similar for main 










much more  likely  to  increase  loans  to  distressed  and  zombie  firms  the  lower  is  their ROA, 
although, as shown  in Table 5, main banks are. Moreover, secondary banks are more  likely to 
increase loans to distressed and zombie firms the lower is their Loans/Assets ratio, the direction 
opposite  to  that  in  Table  5.  Similarly,  the  sign  is  reversed  for  unhealthy  main  banks,  with 
secondary banks less likely to increase loans to distressed and zombie firms with unhealthy main 
banks.  The  sign  of  the  estimated  coefficient  is  similarly  opposite  for  Same  Keiretsu,  with 
secondary banks less likely to increase lending to distressed and zombie firms that are in the same 
keiretsu as their main bank. Thus, as expected, secondary banks are more likely to make business 





The  remaining  regression  tables  investigate  the  contributions  of  increased  credit  to 
improvements in TFP. In particular, the focus is on differences across increases in bonds, main‐
bank  loans,  and  secondary‐bank  loans,  distinguishing  between  healthy  and  unhealthy main 
banks as well as between healthy and unhealthy firms. To make the comparison with loans, the 
increase‐in‐bonds measure is constructed in the same manner as the increase‐in‐loans measure, 
taking  on  a  zero  value  for  observations  in which  the  firm’s  bonds  outstanding  decline.  The 
comparison across sources of credit  is  intended  to  investigate  the extent  to which credit  from 





















bank  loans  improve TFP, with  the  increase being  larger  for high‐TFP  firms  than  for  low‐TFP 
firms. Moreover,  the  total effects are much  larger  than  for bonds or main‐bank  loans  for both 
high‐TFP firms and low‐TFP firms. This would be consistent with secondary banks’ being very 
selective  in  choosing which  firms  receive  their  loans, making  business decisions  rather  than 
basing  loans  on  relationship  considerations.  These  results  suggest  that  firms  that  are  more 
operationally viable (higher TFP) generally are more likely to make better use of increased credit.  
Having a healthy main bank increases the positive impact of main‐bank loans for firms in 
the high‐TFP  cohort.  In  contrast,  increased main‐bank  loans  from unhealthy main  banks  are 
associated with a decline  in  subsequent TFP  for  firms  in  the  low‐TFP  cohort,  consistent with 
unhealthy  main  banks’  increasing  loans  to  weak  firms  that  are  in  survival  mode;  that  is, 
evergreening loans to nonviable firms. Increases in secondary‐bank loans to firms with healthy 




or  low‐TFP  firms with unhealthy main banks have  lower subsequent TFP. However,  the  total 
effect of having a healthy or unhealthy main bank also depends on  the  interaction  terms  that 
contain the main‐bank health variables.  
Columns 3 and 4 contain the results when the observations are split into firm observations 
with healthy  and unhealthy main banks,  avoiding  the need  to  interact  the main‐bank health 
indicators  with  the  variables  measuring  the  increase  in  loans.  While  each  of  the  estimated 
coefficients on increases‐in‐bonds or ‐loans is statistically significant, the most striking results are 
associated with increases in main‐bank loans. For healthy main banks, the coefficients are positive 
and  substantially  exceed  those  for  increases  in  secondary‐bank  loans.  In  sharp  contrast,  the 
estimated  effects  of  increases  in  main‐bank  loans  for  firms  with  unhealthy  main  banks  are 









By  either  distinction  between  financially  healthy  and  unhealthy  firms,  the  results  are  quite 
similar. For healthy firms, increases in bonds and loans are associated with enhanced TFP, with 
the  exception  of  the  negative  differential  effects  for  unhealthy  main  banks,  which  are  not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, for financially unhealthy firms, increases in main‐bank 
loans  also  have  negative  effects,  both  alone  and  interacted  with  the  unhealthy‐main‐bank 
indicator variable. In addition, both lagged values of the unhealthy‐main‐bank indicator variable 






the additional  funds  for  investment. Table 8  investigates  the contribution of various  forms of 
increased credit to net investment. Because net investment would likely be financed by increased 
credit within the same year, contemporaneous rather than lagged values for increased credit are 



















loans  from  unhealthy  main  banks.  Again,  this  is  consistent  with  evergreening  behavior  by 
unhealthy main banks, with  the  loans being used  to keep  financially unhealthy  firms out of 
bankruptcy rather than to enhance the viability of the firms.  
The Table  9  specifications  investigate  the  extent  to which  net  investment  contributes  to 
improved TFP, as well as the extent to which  increased credit has an effect  in addition to that 




improves  firm  TFP.    In  contrast,  net  investment  does  not  have  a  significant  effect  on  the 


























net  investment,  perhaps  through  funding  the  costs  associated with  reducing  the  number  of 
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employees or  restructuring  the business by  selling  fixed assets, as  suggested by Fukuda and 




This  study  investigates evergreening behavior by  Japanese banks during  the post‐bubble 
period, defined here as  fiscal years 1993–2000.  In  investigating  the extent  to which credit was 
misallocated by  increasing  loans  to unhealthy  firms, we distinguish between  financial health, 











evergreening behavior  is  thought  to have played a major  role. Because we  find  similar‐sized 
negative estimated effects of measures of  financial health, such as ROA, on  the magnitude of 
increased bank loans to firms in both the boom and post‐bubble subperiods, such evidence of an 
inverse relationship  in  the post‐bubble period cannot be  interpreted as evidence of wide‐scale 











have much weaker bank‐firm  relationships  than main banks, do not  appear  to participate  in 





TFP make  the best use of credit  for  improving  subsequent TFP. Mimicking  the divergence  in 
behavior  noted  in  bank  lending,  loans  from  secondary  banks  and  healthy  main  banks  are 
associated with a subsequent improvement in firm TFP, while loans from unhealthy main banks 
to  technically  or  financially  unhealthy  firms  tend  to  be  associated  with  deterioration  in 
subsequent firm TFP. Moreover, this effect operates through one or more channels in addition to 
funding fixed investment directly. This evidence is consistent with unhealthy banks’ undertaking 
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Table 1: Percentage of Firms Obtaining Increased Loans in each Firm-Health Cohort, 
for All Banks and for Main-Bank Health Cohorts  
PANEL A: Firms divided into cohorts based on average ROA 
 High ROA Medium ROA Low ROA 
  Percentage of Total Firm Observations with Increased Total Loans 
All Observations 30.71 32.29 36.99 
Healthy Main Banks 29.85 31.94 38.22 
Medium-Health Main Banks 30.88 33.36 35.76 
Unhealthy Main Banks 29.71 30.62 39.68 
 Percentage of Total Firm Observations with Increased Main-Bank Loans
All Observations 29.42 32.94 37.64 
Healthy Main Banks 27.20 32.69 40.11 
Medium-Health Main Banks 30.44 34.49 35.07 
Unhealthy Main Banks 30.65 30.99 38.36 
 Percentage of Total Firm Observations with Increased Secondary-Bank Loans
All Observations 30.93 33.65 35.42 
Healthy Main Banks 28.63 32.87 38.50 
Medium-Health Main Banks 32.19 37.53 30.28 
Unhealthy Main Banks 34.43 39.17 26.40 
 
PANEL B: Firms divided into cohorts based on TFP 
 High TFP Medium TFP Low TFP 
 Percentage of Total Firm Observations with Increased Total Loans
All Observations 35.03 33.87 31.10 
Healthy Main Banks 38.78 33.81 27.41 
Medium-Health Main Banks 35.37 32.47 32.15 
Unhealthy Main Banks 25.44 36.03 38.53 
 Percentage of Total Firm Observations with Increased Main-Bank Loans
All Observations 30.01 34.45 35.54 
Healthy Main Banks 39.85 33.79 26.36 
Medium-Health Main Banks 36.00 33.33 30.67 
Unhealthy Main Banks 24.46 34.34 41.21 
 Percentage of Total Firm Observations with Increased Secondary-Bank 
Loans
All Observations 37.56 35.45 26.99 
Healthy Main Banks 38.97 34.15 26.88 
Medium-Health Main Banks 40.16 35.18 24.66 
Unhealthy Main Banks 45.97 34.12 19.91 
Notes: In the panels above, our sample covers the post-bubble period from 1993 to 2000. Panel A indicates how the 
firm-year observations with increased loans are distributed across the three Average ROA cohorts, while Panel B 
indicates how the firm-year observations with increased loans are distributed across the three TFP cohorts. Average 
ROA is the average return on assets over the two years prior to the year that the increased loans are obtained, while 
TFP is the total factor productivity of the year prior to the year that the increased loans are obtained. TFP is measured 
using the Wooldridge-Levisohn-Petrin estimation technique (Wooldridge 2009). Firms are divided into three cohorts 
based on their Average ROA or on TFP measured relative to the median value of the firm’s industry for each year. 
Main banks are divided into three groups based on their market-to-book ratio in each year. 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics  
 
 Boom Period Post-Bubble Period 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
         
         
Increase in Total Loans/Assets 1.65 3.53 0 36.73 1.53 3.10 0 35.98 
Increase in Main-Bank Loans/Assets 0.61 1.56 0 36.73 0.47 1.18 0 33.55 
Increase in Secondary-Bank Loans/Assets 1.19 2.64 0 36.60 1.23 2.61 0 29.68 
TFP Growth 0.16 0.30 -1.01 1.81 -0.27 2.14 -6.82 3.26 
Net Investment/Capital 6.75 11.36 -28.51 49.73 0.11 7.75 -19.22 49.90 
Log of TFP 4.00 4.36 -3.36 25.44 3.67 4.98 -4.61 29.45 
Average ROA  5.31 4.01 -24.79 26.20 2.92 3.38 -14.29 20.53 
Sales Growth 4.52 12.28 -49.96 71.13 -1.37 10.17 -60.34 64.13 
Average Working Capital 14.64 17.71 -36.18 89.43 15.91 17.31 -62.57 91.28 
Change in ROA -0.06 3.60 -22.65 23.27 -0.48 2.68 -22.01 14.73 
Change in Working Capital 1.12 7.85 -52.81 71.42 -0.72 6.95 -66.36 42.28 
Current Bonds/Assets 0.15 0.54 0 8.62 1.34 3.27 0 24.85 
Loans/Assets 24.54 17.22 0.01 105.97 21.45 16.73 0.02 205.25 
Tangible Asset Share 24.70 10.36 1.95 68.72 28.80 12.27 0.47 77.11 
Log of Assets 17.53 1.47 13.72 22.70 17.17 2.31 12.26 25.61 
Healthy Main Bank (MB) 0.37 0.48 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Unhealthy MB 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Same Keiretsu 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Increase in Bonds/Assets 2.03 4.78 0 42.34 0.63 2.46 0 65.37 
         
 
Notes:  After eliminating the extreme values (see text), the boom period (1984–1989) consists of 756 firms with 3,514 observations. The post-bubble period (1993–
2000) consists of 971 firms with 6,439 observations. When we introduce TFP Growth and Increase in Bonds/Assets in the later specifications, the number of 





TABLE 3:  Benchmark Results - Increase in Loans 
Comparison of Boom and Post-Bubble Periods 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















          
Log of TFPt-1 0.2723 0.4626**a 0.3127 0.4166** 0.2651* 0.1703** 0.1498 0.2811* 
 (0.2409) (0.1325) (0.2479) (0.1342) (0.1091) (0.0622) (0.2038) (0.1098) 
Average ROAt-1 -0.1513** -0.1282** -0.1423* -0.1250** -0.0760** -0.0590** -0.0644 -0.0628 
 (0.0371) (0.0310) (0.0551) (0.0449) (0.0241) (0.0201) (0.0455) (0.0369) 
Sales Growth t-1 0.0468** 0.0325** 0.0465** 0.0332** 0.0154** 0.0086 0.0414** 0.0303** 
 (0.0129) (0.0114) (0.0129) (0.0114) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0107) (0.0094) 
Average Working Capital t-1 -0.0295** -0.0370** -0.0310** -0.0369** -0.0075 -0.0112** -0.0300** -0.0354** 
 (0.0107) (0.0084) (0.0107) (0.0084) (0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0088) (0.0069) 
Change in ROA t-1 -0.0517 -0.2008**a -0.0502 -0.2043**a -0.0112 -0.0566** -0.0536 -0.1789**a
 (0.0426) (0.0418) (0.0426) (0.0418) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0356) (0.0346) 
Change in Working Capital t-1 -0.0425** -0.0665**a -0.0418** -0.0681**a -0.0220** -0.0185** -0.0289** -0.0602**a
 (0.0161) (0.0138) (0.0161) (0.0138) (0.0071) (0.0061) (0.0134) (0.0114) 
Current Bonds/Assets t-1 0.1917 0.3328** 0.1946 0.3324** 0.1338 0.1185** 0.0202 0.2443** 
 (0.2367) (0.0277) (0.2365) (0.0277) (0.1004) (0.0125) (0.2016) (0.0229) 
Loans/Assets t-1 -0.0350** -0.0187* -0.0359** -0.0189* -0.0068 0.0024 -0.0218** -0.0081 
 (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0103) (0.0088) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0085) (0.0070) 
Tangible Asset Share t-1 0.0143 0.0149 0.0139 0.0147 0.0260** 0.0126** -0.0078 0.0067 
 (0.0159) (0.0094) (0.0159) (0.0094) (0.0069) (0.0043) (0.0130) (0.0077) 
Log of Assets t-1 -0.8879** -0.5520**a -0.8873** -0.5585**a -0.5029** -0.3411**b -0.5583** -0.3365** 
 (0.1079) (0.0833) (0.1081) (0.0835) (0.0486) (0.0389) (0.0882) (0.0677) 
Healthy MB t-1 0.1087 -0.1402 0.1403 -0.2247 -0.0088 -0.2034 0.1290 0.0203 
 (0.2865) (0.2023) (0.5492) (0.3081) (0.2407) (0.1396) (0.4553) (0.2539) 
Unhealthy MB t-1 0.0840 0.3517 0.7474 -0.3565 0.6009* 0.0627a 0.2922 -0.2490 
 (0.3070) (0.2274) (0.5479) (0.3432) (0.2381) (0.1520) (0.4554) (0.2825) 
Same Keiretsu t-1 -0.2662 0.0514 -0.2494 0.0164 0.0937 -0.0559 -0.2880 -0.0039 
 (0.2818) (0.2091) (0.2822) (0.2095) (0.1248) (0.0971) (0.2311) (0.1695) 
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(Log of TFP*Healthy MB) t-1   -0.0536 0.0594**a -0.0424 0.0378*a -0.0025 0.0303
   (0.0679) (0.0042) (0.0297) (0.0187) (0.0567) (0.0343) 
(Log of TFP*Unhealthy MB) t-1   -0.0902 0.1505**b -0.0281 0.0179 -0.0455 0.1319**a
   (0.0696) (0.0448) (0.0301) (0.0200) (0.0578) (0.0372) 
(Average ROA*Healthy MB) t-1   0.0299 -0.0418 0.0251 -0.0325 -0.0194 -0.0211 
   (0.0716) (0.0607) (0.0315) (0.0276) (0.0591) (0.0499) 
(Average ROA*Unhealthy MB) t-1   -0.0642 0.0479 -0.0923** 0.0146a 0.0136 0.0121 
   (0.0735) (0.0660) (0.0320) (0.0293) (0.0607) (0.0547) 
         
Pseudo R-squared 0.0404 0.0409 0.0535 0.0397 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 9, 953 9, 953 9, 953 9, 953 
Notes: *: Significant at 5%; **: Significant at 1%. The regressions use a Tobit specification, with standard errors (in parentheses) calculated using the observed 
information matrix (OIM).  a and b denote that the coefficient for the post-bubble period (1993–2000) differs from that for the boom period (1984–89) at 5% and 
1% levels of significance, respectively. In addition to industry*year fixed effects, all regressions control for random effects at the firm level. The dependent 














1993 8.82 7.46 736 
1994 10.41 9.93 780 
1995 6.42 12.24 794 
1996 6.23 9.32 806 
1997 5.52 16.69 834 
1998 9.91 14.41 838 
1999 7.58 11.28 824 
2000 6.59 9.34 827 
 
Table 4B: Increase in Bonds and Loans by Category of Firms  
  
Increase in Bonds 
 
Increase in  
Main-Bank Loans 




(as a percentage of non-distressed firms) 
37.62 62.42 68.05 
Distressed  
(as a percentage of distressed firms) 
9.02 49.18 16.13 
Not a Zombie 
(as a percentage of non-zombie firms) 
35.70 71.32 73.12 
Zombie 
(as a percentage of zombie firms) 
14.16 56.94 23.14 
    



















 Not Distressed Distressed 
(1) 1.0000   1.0000   
       
(2) -0.0163 1.0000  -0.1651** 1.0000  
 (0.2017)   (0.0151)   
(3) 0.0530** 0.3349** 1.0000 0.2115** -0.3656** 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0031) (0.0051)  
  Not a Zombie   Zombie 
(1) 1.0000   1.0000   
       
(2) -0.0578** 1.0000  -0.1451** 1.0000  
 (0.0000)   (0.0215)   
(3) -0.0160** 0.3935** 1.0000 0.2341** -0.3542** 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0045) (0.0015)  
Notes: *: Significant at 5%; **: Significant at 1%. A distressed firm has interest expense that exceeds its operating income 
in two consecutive years (t and t-1) but is less than its operating income in the year before these consecutive years (t-2). A 
zombie firm receives subsidized credit; that is, it has actual interest expense less than a hypothetical lower bound based on 





Table 5: Determinants of Increase in Main-Bank Loans by Alternative Measures of Firm Health 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










           
Log of TFP t-1   0.1754** 0.0379 0.2012** 0.0208 
   (0.0611) (0.2118) (0.0585) (0.2062) 
Average ROA t-1 -0.0603* -0.0646* -0.0596** -0.1964** -0.0490** -0.1202** 
 (0.0236) (0.0228) (0.0141) (0.0086) (0.0135) (0.0398) 
Sales Growth t-1 0.0165* 0.0142* 0.0092* 0.0071 0.0078* 0.0015 
 (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0045) (0.0132) (0.0031) (0.0124) 
Average Working Capital t-1 -0.0132* -0.0199** -0.0097* -0.0238* -0.0066* -0.0217* 
 (0.0064) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0095) (0.0028) (0.0101) 
Change in ROA t-1 -0.0631* -0.0693* -0.0462* -0.1029 -0.0511** -0.0816 
 (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0184) (0.0677) (0.0179) (0.0510) 
Change in Working Capital t-1 -0.0022 -0.0029 -0.0205** -0.0065 -0.0186** -0.0198 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0060) (0.0167) (0.0059) (0.0175) 
Current Bonds/Assets t-1 0.1564** 0.1551** 0.1126** 0.1737** 0.1132** 0.1976* 
 (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0123) (0.0346) (0.0112) (0.0762) 
Loans/Assets t-1 0.0075 0.0097* 0.0040 0.0075* 0.0049 0.0063* 
 (0.0061) (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0031) 
Tangible Asset Share t-1 0.0034 0.0032* -0.0137* 0.0080* -0.0173** 0.0182* 
 (0.0072) (0.0012) (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0090) 
Log of Assets t-1 -0.2334** -0.2345** -0.3363** -0.3802** -0.3579** -0.1764* 
 (0.0627) (0.0602) (0.0043) (0.1180) (0.0370) (0.0615) 
Healthy MB t-1 0.0801** -0.0922* 0.2931** -0.1113 0.2669* -0.1941 
 (0.0131) (0.0423) (0.0084) (0.4128) (0.1107) (0.3320) 
Unhealthy MB t-1 0.0293 0.0564** 0.0893 0.3209* 0.0916 0.1214** 
 (0.1651) (0.0143) (0.1279) (0.1452) (0.1262) (0.0314) 
Same Keiretsu t-1 -0.0563 0.0310** -0.0509 0.0459* -0.0210 0.0534* 
 (0.1760) (0.0101) (0.0092) (0.0196) (0.0930) (0.0212) 
(Log of TFP*Healthy MB) t-1   0.0377* 0.0904** 0.0271** 0.1014** 
   (0.0184) (0.0286) (0.0067) (0.0366) 
(Log of TFP*Unhealthy MB) t-1   0.0152 -0.0271 0.0209 -0.0386 
   (0.0197) (0.0588) (0.0189) (0.0664) 
Constant 2.7057* 2.7527* 4.5318** 1.3794** 2.1130* 4.7291** 
 (1.1532) (1.1324) (1.2013) (0.0855) (0.0440) (1.1072) 
       
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0863 0.0564 0.1348 0.1015 0.1714 0.1513 
Firm-Year Observations 2,147 2,144 5,491 948 5,279 1,160 
Notes: *: Significant at 5%; **: Significant at 1%. The regressions use a Tobit specification, with standard errors (in 
parentheses) calculated using the observed information matrix (OIM). See Table 4 notes for descriptions of distressed  
and zombie firm classifications. In addition to Industry*Year fixed effects, all regressions control for random effects at the 
firm level. The dependent variable is measured as the change in main bank loans between periods t and (t-1) divided by assets 






Table 6: Determinants of Increase in Secondary-Bank Loans by Alternative Measures of Firm Health  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










           
Log of TFP t-1   0.2856** 0.0573 0.2758* 0.0453 
   (0.1097) (0.5599) (0.1094) (0.2115) 
Average ROA t-1 -0.0612** -0.0213 -0.0535* -0.0111 -0.0799** -0.0105* 
 (0.0201) (0.0455) (0.0260) (0.2596) (0.0260) (0.0051) 
Sales Growth t-1 0.0433** 0.0211** 0.0292** 0.0234 0.0336** 0.0178 
 (0.0152) (0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0337) (0.0101) (0.0230) 
Average Working Capital t-1 -0.0576** -0.0246* -0.0376** -0.0240 -0.1461** -0.0210 
 (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0069) (0.0320) (0.0362) (0.0192) 
Change in ROA t-1 -0.2350** -0.0664 -0.1517** -0.0835 -0.3546** -0.2114 
 (0.0640) (0.0596) (0.0355) (0.1766) (0.1115) (0.1152) 
Change in Working Capital t-1 -0.0557** -0.0717** -0.0953** -0.0713 -0.0687** -0.0173 
 (0.0211) (0.0200) (0.0116) (0.0455) (0.0118) (0.0338) 
Current Bonds/Assets t-1 0.3421** 0.2645** 0.2468** 0.3060** 0.2273** 0.2565* 
 (0.0392) (0.0413) (0.0233) (0.0914) (0.0222) (0.1391) 
Loans/Assets t-1 -0.0202 -0.0347* -0.0084 -0.0764* -0.0081 -0.0514* 
 (0.0127) (0.0153) (0.0044) (0.0312) (0.0072) (0.0182) 
Tangible Asset Share t-1 -0.0210 0.0514* 0.0047 0.0145** 0.0047 0.0037** 
 (0.0150) (0.0225) (0.0078) (0.0031) (0.0080) (0.0010) 
Log of Assets t-1 -0.3283** 0.0347 -0.3411** 0.0271 -0.3653** -0.1049 
 (0.0987) (0.1191) (0.0678) (0.3168) (0.0672) (0.2400) 
Healthy MB t-1 0.0319* 0.0961* 0.1413* 0.1719 0.1187* 0.0815 
 (0.0115) (0.0351) (0.0069) (0.1732) (0.0432) (0.2116) 
Unhealthy MB t-1 0.0154 -0.2424** -0.0469 -0.2114* -0.0698 -0.5951** 
 (0.0121) (0.0761) (0.2373) (0.1013) (0.2477) (0.1214) 
Same Keiretsu t-1 -0.0410 -0.3698* -0.0503 -0.1817* -0.0230 -0.2285* 
 (0.2829) (0.1273) (0.1721) (0.0742) (0.1718) (0.1016) 
(Log of TFP*Healthy MB) t-1   0.1444** 0.1215** 0.1098** 0.0815* 
   (0.0201) (0.0386) (0.0267) (0.0386) 
(Log of TFP*Unhealthy MB) t-1   -0.0975 -0.0379 -0.0205 -0.0145 
   (0.0813) (0.0288) (0.0947) (0.0563) 
Constant 7.5488* -2.5136* 5.4682* 1.5588 5.8936* -3.2811 
 (3.6781) (1.1614) (2.2531) (5.7527) (2.1647) (5.1449) 
       
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0783 0.0546 0.1615 0.0816 0.1813 0.1643 
Firm-Year Observations 2,147 2,144 5,491 948 5,279 1,160 
Notes: *: Significant at 5%; **: Significant at 1%. The regressions use a Tobit specification, with standard errors (in 
parentheses) calculated using the observed information matrix (OIM). See Table 4 notes for descriptions of distressed  
and zombie firm classifications. In addition to Industry*Year fixed effects, all regressions control for random effects at the firm 
level. The dependent variable is measured as the change in secondary bank loans between periods t and (t-1) divided by assets in 






TABLE 7: TFP Growth and Credit  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























         
(Increase in bonds)t-1 0.0208** 0.0066** 0.0201** 0.0165* 0.0321** 0.0119** 0.0403** 0.0115* 
 (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0051) (0.0073) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0052) 
(Increase in bonds)t-2 0.0147** 0.0021* 0.0154* 0.0087* 0.0143** 0.0040 0.0046* 0.0016 
 (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0073) (0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0075) 
(Increase in MB loans)t-1 0.0140* -0.0359* 0.0326** -0.0116* 0.0119** -0.0092 0.0409* -0.0112 
 (0.0070) (0.0122) (0.0096) (0.0058) (0.0032) (0.0181) (0.0199) (0.0531) 
(Increase in MB loans)t-2 0.0293* -0.0092* 0.0525** -0.0337** 0.0561* -0.0379* 0.0403** -0.0275* 
 (0.0110) (0.0035) (0.0229) (0.0090) (0.0235) (0.0168) (0.0018) (0.0117) 
(Increase in secondary-bank (SB) loans)t-1 0.0387** 0.0184** 0.0247** 0.0150* 0.0221* 0.0103 0.0615** 0.0006 
 (0.0142) (0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0067) (0.0100) (0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0118) 
(Increase in SB loans)t-2 0.0634** 0.0181** 0.0026* 0.0081** 0.0316* 0.0046 0.0377** 0.0026 
 (0.0188) (0.0047) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0127) (0.0079) (0.0096) (0.0093) 
(Increase in MB loans *Healthy MB)t-1 0.3527** 0.0339 0.0772* 0.0036 0.0346* 0.0034 
 (0.0700) (0.0327) (0.0295) (0.0285) (0.0120) (0.0847) 
(Increase in MB loans *Healthy MB)t-2 0.1277* 0.0332   0.0234 0.0053 0.0255 0.0117 
 (0.0516) (0.0355)   (0.0424) (0.0293) (0.0363) (0.0283) 
(Increase in MB loans *Unhealthy MB)t-1 -0.0258 -0.0424** -0.0087 -0.0142** -0.0234 -0.0486** 
 (0.0575) (0.0114) (0.0292) (0.0067) (0.0351) (0.0078) 
(Increase in MB loans*Unhealthy MB)t-2 -0.0154 -0.0063**   -0.0184 -0.0160 -0.0091 -0.0208 
 (0.0709) (0.0014)   (0.0428) (0.0325) (0.0454) (0.0226) 
(Increase in SB loans*Healthy MB)t-1 0.0420* 0.0163** 0.0100** 0.0150* 0.0117** 0.0179* 
 (0.0211) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0071) (0.0008) (0.0082) 
(Increase in SB loans*Healthy MB)t-2 0.0391 0.0110   0.0145** 0.0031* 0.0127* 0.0012 
 (0.0308) (0.0071)   (0.0046) (0.0012) (0.0054) (0.0108) 
(Increase in SB loans*Unhealthy MB)t-1 -0.0211 -0.0022 -0.0039 -0.0105 -0.0127 -0.0263 
 (0.0295) (0.0087) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0148) (0.0213) 
(Increase in SB loans*Unhealthy MB)t-2 -0.0095 -0.0098 -0.0070 -0.0064 -0.0021 -0.0331 
 (0.0356) (0.0065) (0.0212) (0.0136) (0.0179) (0.0230) 
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(Healthy MB)t-1 0.2714** 0.0222 0.1089* 0.0130** 0.0747* 0.0101* 
 (0.0853) (0.0203) (0.0425) (0.0030) (0.0317) (0.0046) 
(Healthy MB)t-2 0.0545 0.0341   0.0416 0.0377 0.0148 0.0216 
 (0.0874) (0.0177)   (0.0435) (0.0304) (0.0364) (0.0413) 
(Unhealthy MB)t-1 -0.1426* -0.0060** -0.1606** -0.0620* -0.0562 -0.1751** 
 (0.0703) (0.0009) (0.0444) (0.0301) (0.0399) (0.0523) 
(Unhealthy MB)t-2 -0.2857** -0.0120* -0.0462 -0.0737* -0.0441 -0.0797* 
 (0.0915) (0.0059) (0.0464) (0.0311) (0.0471) (0.0341) 
Firm-Year Observations 1,834 1,828 2,011 1,401 4,589 904 4,507 986 
Adjusted R- Squared 0.6104 0.5413 0.5614 0.5012 0.5563 0.4267 0.5643 0.5132 
Notes: *: significant at 5% level; **: significant at 1% level. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. In addition to the variables shown above, all 
regressions also include Log of Assets, Average Working Capital, Tangible Asset Share, and Loan Share, each lagged one period, and a constant term. The 
coefficients on these additional controls are not included for brevity and can be obtained from the authors. In addition, all tables also include firm and year fixed 




TABLE 8: Net Investment and Credit – Contemporaneous Relationship 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























         
Increase in bonds 0.4765** 0.2109 0.3629** 0.0106 1.3437** 0.6106 1.3316** 0.2506 
 (0.1132) (0.1061) (0.0850) (0.1590) (0.0646) (1.1199) (0.0666) (0.1967) 
Increase in MB loans 0.7466* 0.2439 0.3012* 0.0665 1.3453** 0.9848 1.2158** 0.7044 
 (0.3358) (0.6558) (0.0983) (0.3793) (0.2367) (2.0004) (0.2472) (0.7586) 
Increase in SB loans 0.3312** 0.1233 0.4252** 0.1291 2.1172** 0.3436 1.1555** 0.0610 
 (0.1248) (0.1843) (0.1320) (0.1366) (0.0818) (1.9994) (0.0052) (0.1505) 
Increase in MB loans*Healthy MB 0.9390* 0.0695 1.3275** 1.0026 1.2256** 1.4687 
 (0.3613) (0.7367) (0.2533) (2.6856) (0.3260) (0.7881) 
Increase in MB loans*Unhealthy MB 0.5750 -0.1044 -0.0237 -7.1190* 0.0647 -5.2392* 
 (0.5788) (0.8766) (0.3901) (3.6707) (0.4279) (2.5124) 
Increase in SB loans*Healthy MB 0.5984* 0.1838 0.3592** 0.1529 0.3999* 0.1644 
 (0.2126) (0.2323) (0.1337) (1.4112) (0.1580) (0.3317) 
Increase in SB loans*Unhealthy MB 0.0763 0.0397 0.2048 0.8061 0.2345 0.5502 
 (0.2188) (0.2767) (0.1417) (0.6099) (0.1630) (0.4010) 
Healthy MB 0.4650 0.0025   -0.1481 -1.6185 -0.1677 -0.0904 
 (0.5316) (0.5448)   (0.1017) (0.9473) (0.1042) (0.1884) 
Unhealthy MB 0.6847 -0.3043   -0.0036 -1.5863 0.0026 -0.1178 
 (0.6339) (0.6888)   (0.0350) (0.8574) (0.0383) (0.0767) 
Firm-Year Observations 1,834 1,828 2,011 1,401 4,589 904 4,507 986 
Within R-squared 0.1964 0.1604 0.2089 0.1372 0.1401 0.1943 0.1436 0.1725 
Notes: *: significant at 5% level; **: significant at 1% level. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. In addition to the variables shown 
above, all regressions also include Log of Assets, Average Working Capital, Tangible Asset Share, Loan Share, and a constant term. The coefficients on 
these additional controls are not included for brevity and can be obtained from the authors. In addition, all tables also include firm and year fixed effects to 






TABLE 9: TFP Growth, Net Investment, and Credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























              
(Net investment)t-1 0.0061** -0.0014 0.0036** 0.0002 0.4847** 0.0007 0.4325** -0.0004 
 (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0009) 
(Net investment)t-2 0.0016* -0.0001 0.0023* -0.0015 0.0325** 0.0006 0.0943* -0.0015 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0414) (0.0014) 
(Increase in bonds)t-1 0.0211* -0.0007 0.0173* 0.0126* 0.2513** 0.0239** 0.0820** 0.0014* 
 (0.0106) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0123) (0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0007) 
(Increase in bonds)t-2 0.0037 -0.0039 0.0018 0.0041 0.1546** 0.0162** 0.0644** 0.0089** 
 (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0431) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0028) 
(Increase in MB loans)t-1 0.0289* 0.0087 0.0601* 0.0099 0.8654** -0.0142 0.0524* -0.0430* 
 (0.01311) (0.0166) (0.0242) (0.0287) (0.1134) (0.0208) (0.0211) (0.0211) 
(Increase in MB loans)t-2 0.0479* -0.0032 0.0441* 0.0137 0.3899** -0.0526* 0.0456* -0.0859* 
 (0.0186) (0.0132) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.1275) (0.0246) (0.0211) (0.0303) 
(Increase in SB loans)t-1 0.0098** -0.0039 0.0187* 0.0057* 0.0432** 0.0203** 0.0342** 0.0171** 
 (0.0018) (0.0058) (0.0071) (0.0021) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0987) (0.0015) 
(Increase in SB loans)t-2 0.0114 -0.0078 0.0086 0.0051* 0.7345** 0.0302* 0.0408** 0.0012 
 (0.0110) (0.0081) (0.0102) (0.0024) (0.1146) (0.0123) (0.0061) (0.0101) 
(Increase in MB loans*Healthy MB)t-1 0.0139 0.0025   0.7913** 0.0413 0.4327** 0.0315* 
 (0.0345) (0.0292)   (0.1235) (0.0314) (0.0087) (0.0132) 
(Increase in MB loans*Healthy MB)t-2 0.0282 0.0220   0.4539** 0.0315* 0.0500* 0.0084 
 (0.0370) (0.0183)   (0.0987) (0.0142) (0.0201) (0.0281) 
(Increase in MB loans*Unhealthy MB)t-1 0.0145 -0.0156   -0.0143 -0.0252* -0.0132 -0.0473* 
 (0.0405) (0.0201)   (0.0543) (0.0112) (0.0096) (0.0201) 
(Increase in MB loans*Unhealthy MB)t-2 -0.0695 -0.0185   -0.0796 -0.0217 -0.0143 -0.0190* 
 (0.0369) (0.0170)   (0.3143) (0.0444) (0.0089) (0.0072) 
(Increase in SB loans*Healthy MB)t-1 0.0133 0.0042   0.3038** 0.0105* 0.2015** 0.0154* 
 (0.0109) (0.0073)   (0.0842) (0.0043) (0.0701) (0.0057) 
(Increase in SB loans*Healthy MB)t-2 0.0015 0.0046   0.7631** 0.0132** 0.2436** 0.0764** 
 (0.0150) (0.0088)   (0.2456) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0235) 
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(Increase in SB loans*Unhealthy MB)t-1 0.0113** -0.0037   -0.0154 -0.0190 -0.0187 -0.0314 
 (0.0026) (0.0076)   (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0765) (0.1243) 
(Increase in SB loans*Unhealthy MB)t-2  0.0316* -0.0045   0.0456 -0.0007 -0.0324 -0.0183 
 (0.0112) (0.0086)   (0.0865) (0.0228) (0.0224) (0.0246) 
(Healthy MB)t-1 0.1220* 0.0057 0.4404** 0.1127** 0.2043** 0.0987* 
 (0.0497) (0.0207) (0.0875) (0.0428) (0.0564) (0.0415) 
(Healthy MB)t-2 0.0430* 0.0101   0.0812* 0.0530* 0.0514* 0.0193* 
 (0.0137) (0.0178)   (0.0387) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0071) 
(Unhealthy MB)t-1 0.0883 -0.0075 -0.0564 -0.1517** -0.1042 -0.1784* 
 (0.0554) (0.0281) (0.0413) (0.0437) (0.0812) (0.0841) 
(Unhealthy MB)t-2 -0.0765 -0.0050 -0.0561 -0.0797 -0.0389 -0.0785 
 (0.0663) (0.0299) (0.0435) (0.0466) (0.0742) (0.0516) 
Firm-Year Observations 1,834 1,828 2,011 1,401 4,589 904 4,507 986 
R-squared 0.7272 0.6501 0.7174 0.6858 0.1727 0.1965 0.1534 0.2015 
Notes: *: significant at 5% level; **: significant at 1% level. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. In addition to the variables shown above, 
all regressions also include Log of Assets, Average Working Capital, Tangible Asset Share, and Loan Share, each lagged one period, and a constant term. 
The coefficients on these additional controls are not included for brevity and can be obtained from the authors. In addition, all tables also include firm and 
year fixed effects to control for unobserved variations in firm characteristics and yearly events. The sample period includes fiscal years 1993–2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
